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Abstract
This paper reports experimental evidence from a series of a simple Dic-
tator Games in which, randomly matched in pair, subjects choose repeatedly
one out of four alternatives involving a pair of fixed monetary prizes, one
for them and the other for an anonymously matched subject. While in
some treatments player position (i.e. the identity of the best paid agent)
is known in advance before subjects have to select their favorite option, in
one treatment subjects choose under “the veil of ignorance”, only knowing
that either role is equally likely. Finally, we also collect evidence from an-
other treatment, in which the same options correponds to binary lotteries,
in which subjects may win one prize or the other with equal probability.
Subjects’ decisions are framed in the realm of a simple mean-variance utility
maximization problem, where the parameter associated to the variance is
interpreted (depending on the treatment) as a measure of risk or inequality
aversion, or some combination of the two.
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1 Introduction
At first sight, risk and inequity aversion appear to be rather unrelated con-
cepts. By the former, we refer to “the reluctance of a person to accept a
bargain with an uncertain payoﬀ rather than another bargain with a more
certain, but possibly lower, expected payoﬀ”; by the latter, “the preference
for fairness and resistance to inequitable outcomes.”1 This consideration
notwithstanding, these concepts can be related on several grounds. The
first, intuitive connection comes from the fact that, no matter how you want
to operationally define them, they both rely on some measure of distance (or
distribution) of outcomes. In this respect, a risk-averse individual is willing
to accept a lower expected reward in search of a smaller outcome variability
and -by the same token- an inequity averse individual is willing to opt for a
poorer society, if this implies less income inequality.
The hypothetical frame of the veil of ignorance (VOI hereafter) is built
exactly upon this intuitive similarity. Rousseau’s [22] original position is,
probably the first example of the VOI: the simple idea is to look at consti-
tutional rules from the point of view of an outside observer, not knowing
which will be our role (say: income, social status, opportunities) in the soci-
ety. A similar viewpoint is taken by John Rawls’ [21] influential book, The
Theory of Justice, in which the VOI is applied to put forward the maxmin
principle, as the (rational) principle to implement social justice. As it is well
known, this view has been strongly criticized by John Harsanyi’s treatment
of the VOI, by which the utilitaristic approach is justified by the fact that
the preferences of an “impartial and sympathetic” observer should be con-
cerned with “. . . the welfare of each participant but having no partial bias
in favor of any participant... (p. 49)”. At the core of this line of argument
lies the idea that it is possible to make distributional judgements taking ex-
pectations over purely self-interested preferences, once the probability (and
the associated risk) of being any “participant” in the society is properly
taken into account. In this respect, it is exactly the VOI hypothetical frame
which provides purely self-interested preferences with a distributional taste.
Thirty years later, many economists are now used to think that distri-
butional (or “social”) preferences may well exist even without the fictitious
frame of the VOI. This view has been largely influenced by the vast ex-
perimental literature showing that subjects, in many classic experimental
protocols, exhibit social (i.e. interdependent) preferences, with a strong
1Both definitions are borrowed from the correponding entries of Wikipedia
(http://www.wikipedia.org).
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taste against inequality.2 This, implicitly, challenges Harsanyi’s claim, un-
less it is provided a suitable frame in which we can disentangle risk from
distributional concerns, when it comes to situations in which individuals
have to choose among risky prospects which aﬀect the well-being of others.
In this respect, there is a growing empirical literature which use ques-
tionnaire data to jointly estimate risk and distributional preferences under
several functional forms. Paradigmatic is the case of Carlsson et al. [7],
who measure subjects’ preferences for risk and inequality through choices
between imagined societies and lotteries. They also collect personal informa-
tion on the socio-demographic characteristics of their subject pool, conclud-
ing that “ ... (even under the veil of ignorance) many people appear to have
preferences regarding equality per se. We have also found that both relative
risk aversion and inequality aversion vary with sex and political preferences.
On average, women and left-wing voters have higher parameter values for
both relative risk aversion and inequality aversion” (p. 391).3
In this literature, subjects mainly face hypothetical situations and, in
this sense, their viewpoint resembles that of Harsanyi’s “impartial and sym-
pathetic observer”. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper
in which risk and distributional concerns are estimated using observations
from subjects’ actual decisions (that is, decisions which directly aﬀect their
own, together with others’, financial rewards in the experiment).4
To this aim, we borrow the design (and part of the experimental evi-
dence) from the work of Cabrales et al. [5], who set up a complex 3-phase
experimental design to estimate subjects’ distributional and reciprocity con-
cern (within the realm of Charness and Rabin’s [8] model, C&R hereafter)
to explain (and predict) their behavior in a stylized (matching) labor mar-
ket. Distributional preference parameters are estimated in the first phase of
the experiment, a simple Dictator Game in which subjects repeatedly select
their favorite option among a fixed menu, which changes at every round,
of four options which consist in two monetary prizes, one for them, one for
another (randomly and anonymously matched) subject participating to the
experiment.
In the experiment, player position (i.e. the identity of the best paid
agent) is constant across options, and known in advance by subjects be-
fore they have to make their decisions. While Cabrales et al. [5] employ
C&R’s model to estimate subjects’ purely distributional preferences, we do
2The experimental evidence is well summarized in the excellent surveys of Fehr-Schmidt
[13] and Sobel [23].
3See also Amiel et al. [2], Kroll and Davidovitz [19]and Bosmans and Schokkaert [4]
4 In this respect, our experimental setting is closer to that of Horish [18].
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so by means of a simple mean-variance utility function in which the para-
meter associated with the variance, basically, estimates subjects’ inequality
aversion.
In this paper, we also complement Cabrales et al.’s [5] evidence with two
additional treatments in which
1. the same sequence of choices is made under the VOI, that is, before
being acknowledged of their player position, but knowing that either
role is equally likely and;
2. the same sequence of choices is under a “lottery frame”, in which
player position is unknown (and equally likely), but no other subject
is involved in the decision.
Also for these new treatments, subjects’ decisions are framed by the
same mean-variance behavioral model, where, for the lottery treatment, the
parameter associated with the variance reflects pure risk attitudes, while in
the VOI treatment, supposingly, both risk and inequality concerns condition
subjects’ decisions. In this respect, the exercise here is rather diﬀerent from
that of the literature cited above: instead of disentangling risk by inequal-
ity by functional identification, we exploit the experimental methodology
by designing specific economic environments which are characterized by the
presence of either variable (or a combination of the two), checking how these
alternative specifications of the strategic setting aﬀect the estimates of the
same parameter, under the same statistical model. Finally, we also condi-
tions our estimates to our subject pool’s socio-demographic characteristics
we infer from a detailed questionnaire, administered to all subjects at the
end of each section.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2 we
briefly describe our experimental design, where in Section 3 we present the
results of our econometric exercise, Finally, Section 4 concludes, followed by
an Appendix containing the experimental instructions.
2 Experimental design
In what follows, we describe the features of our experimental environment.
2.1 Sessions
We run sessions each under four diﬀerent treatments, T1 to T4 (2 sessions in
case of T4, 3 sessions for each of the other treatments). All 11 experimental
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sessions were conducted at the Laboratory of Theoretical and Experimental
Economics (LaTEx), of the Universidad de Alicante. A total of 264 students
(24 per session) were recruited among the undergraduate population of the
Universidad de Alicante -mainly, students from the Economics Department
with no (or very little) prior exposure to game theory. The experimental
sessions were computerized. Instructions were read aloud and we let subjects
ask about any doubt they may have had.5 In all sessions (but those of
T4), subjects were divided into two matching groups of 12, with subjects
from diﬀerent matching groups never interacting with each other throughout
the session. Given this design feature, we shall read the data under the
assumption that the history of each matching group (6 in total, for each
treatment T1 to T3) corresponds to an independent observation.6
The experimental layout of treatments T1 to T3 was rather complex. In
all sessions, subjects played three phases, P1 to P3, of increasing complexity,
for a total of 72 rounds (24 rounds per phase). In this paper, we shall only
report on evidence of the first phase of the experiment (i.e. the first 24
rounds), P1.
In P1, the timing for each round t and matching group is as follows:
1. At the beginning of the round, six pairs are formed at random.
2. Then, after being informed about the choice set Ct =
©
bk : k = 1, ..., 4
ª
, bk =
¡
bk1, b
k
2
¢
-where bk1 corresponds to player i’s monetary payoﬀ
(with bk1 ≥ bk2)- each subject has to choose her favorite option.
3. Once choices are made, all relevant information is revealed and payoﬀs
are distributed.
2.2 Treatment
We now explain the details of the four experimental treatment condition
2.2.1 T1 : The control treatment
In T1, choices are made by subjects conditional of being informed of their
player (i.e. their relative) position within the pair. Remember that, since
5The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007). The complete set of instructions, translated into English, can be found
in the Appendix.
6Clearly, the same does not apply in case of T4 in that, since each subject faces in-
dividual decisions, each subject’s experimental history corresponds to an independent
observation.
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bk1 ≥ bk2 for all k, player 1 (2) looks at the distributional problem implicit
in the choice of an option from the (dis)advantageous viewpoint. Once
choices are made, another iid draw fixes the identity of the Dictator (for
that couple and round), that is, the subject whose choice determines the
monetary rewards for that pair and round.
In T1, subjects alternate player and Dictator positions in a (iid) random
fashion. This, in turn, implies that:
1. thanks to the strategy method, we are able to track the choices of both
the Dictator and the non Dictator;
2. since subjects experience both player positions across rounds, fair-
ness can be achieved by i) choosing options with smaller variability
across players or ii) selecting options very unfair for the disadvan-
taged Player 2, and letting random player allocation achieving fairness
across rounds.
2.2.2 T2 : Fixing player position
In T2 we modify the control treatment, T1, in two respects:
a) Subjects experience one player position only, either Player 1 or Player
2, throughout the entire experiment and
b) we don’t apply the strategy method, in that a public random draw
selects the Dictator before agents are asked to pick up their favorite
contract. While the Dictator decides, the other player simply waits
for the result.
The reason for these modifications was exactly to check the robustness
of our estimations under two alternative specifications of the design features
highlighted by points 1. and 2. in the previous section.
2.2.3 T3 : The VOI control treatment
In T3 we modify the control treatment, T1, by introducing the VOI. Here
subjects make their choice not knowing their player (i.e. their relative)
position, but only knowing that each position is equally likely. Everything
else is just as in T1, in particular the fact that subjects alternate player and
Dictator positions in a (iid) random fashion.
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2.2.4 T4 : The lottery treatment
Finally, our lottery treatment T4 replicates T3 at the individual level: player
position is uncertain (and equally likely), but each subject decides in isola-
tion, without any payoﬀ externality on others.
2.3 The Questionnaire
At the end of each session, subjects were asked to answer a detailed ques-
tionnaire to which we distilled the following variables, which will be used in
Section 3.3:
1. gender=1 for females;
2. RiskLover∈ [0, 1], indicating the relative frequency of “risky” choices
in a series of 5 binary lotteries Holt and Laury’s [17] style.
3. WorkedLastWeek∈ {1, 6} , a proxy of subjects’ disposable income.
4. RoomSizeRatio: the ratio between number of rooms in the main
residence and the number of the family members (i.e., a proxy of the
family’s wealth).
5. InequalityAnswer∈ {0, 1}. A classic test of concerns for inequality,
contained in many Social Capital questionnaires. Q. “Consider the
following situation: Two secretaries with the same age do exactly the
same work. However, one of them earns 20 euros per week more than
the other. The one that is paid more is more eﬃcient and faster,
while working. Do you believe it is fair that one earns more than the
other?”. IA= 1 if the answer is no, and 0 otherwise.
6. PARents∈ {0, 1} . Another classic question. Choose between “In-
dependently of the qualities and deficiencies of parents, they should
always be loved and respected” (PAR=0) and “Parents who have not
earned the love by their attitudes and behavior should not be loved”
(PAR=1).
3 Estimating social and risk preferences
In this Section, we propose a simple econometric model by which we simul-
taneously estimate subjects’ risk and distributional preferences. In what
follows, i (and j) identify our subjects in T4 (matched in pair in T1 to T3).
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Let µ(k) = b
k
1+b
k
2
2 and σ(k) =
q
(bk1 − µ(k))2 + (bk2 − µ(k))2 denote the arith-
metic mean and standard deviation of the monetary payoﬀs associated with
option k, respectively. We assume that subject i’s preferences by choosing
option k = 1, ...4, are defined by the following
Definition 1 (Mean-Variance Preferences)
ui(k) = vi(k)− γiσ(k) + εki , (1)
where vi(k) = bki in treatments T1 and T2 and vi(k) = µ(k) in treatments
T3 and T4, and εki is an idiosyncratic error term (with zero mean and fixed
variance) to facilitate estimation. In other words, we postulate that subjects
evaluate options by way of a simple mean-variance utility function (with
noise), where γi measures, depending on the treatment, i’s sensitiveness
either to risk or to inequality aversion (or some combination of the two).
In particular:
1. As for T1 and T2, γi is clearly a measure of pure distributional concern.
Since, in both treatments, subjects are informed about their player
position before they have to decide their favorite option, using Fehr
and Schmidt’s [12] terminology, we can think of γ1 as a measure of
“guilt”, and γ2 as a measure of “envy”.
2. In T4 subjects face ordinary binary lotteries. In this case, γi measures
“pure” risk aversion (with γi = 0 indicating the null hypothesis of
risk-neutrality).
3. Also in T3 i chooses among lotteries, but this decision has distribu-
tional consequences for player j, too. In this sense, we expect γi to
capture some combination of both eﬀects, one related to risk, the other
related to inequality.
According to this notation, subject i chooses contract kˆ at round t if
kˆ = argmax
k
{ui(k)} .
Under the assumption that the stochastic term εki is iid with an extreme
value distribution, the probability that individual i chooses the contract k
at round t is therefore
Pr
³
yit = kˆ
´
=
exp
³
ui(kˆ)
´
P4
k=1 exp (ui(k))
. (2)
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Notice that (2) allows for parameter heterogeneity across subjects. Thus,
the iid assumption does not stem from neglected individual unobserved het-
erogeneity, and it is consistent with the random order of the four contracts
in the choice set Ct. In what follows, we shall provide estimates of (2) for
diﬀerent models specifications.
3.1 Model 1: constant parameter
In this Section, we estimate (2) assuming that γi = g0, that is, γi is a con-
stant parameter. We shall propose two sets of estimates: one in which (2) is
applied to each subject participating in the experiment (using 24 observa-
tions for each individual estimate), one in which we impose a constant (i.e.
a pool) estimate within each treatment, T1 to T4.
Figure 1 reports the distributions of individual γi, disaggregated for
treatment condition, T1 to T4.
Figure 1. Individual estimates of γi
As Figure 1 shows, distributions are positively skewed (i.e. for which
aversion to inequality and/or risk is predominant) and, with the exception
of T3, bimodal. These two features have diﬀerent implications, depending
on the treatment under consideration. For example, while in T4 bimodality
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implies a basic heterogeneity with respect to risk attitudes, in T2 bimodality
may reflect heterogeneous concerns to inequality, depending on the relative
position within the pair (remember that in T2 player positions are constant
across rounds).7
In Table 1 we report estimates of γi “pooled” by treatment, i.e. when
(??) is estimated under the assumption that γi is constant across treatment
Th (i.e. γi = g
h, h = 1, ..., 4).
Coeff. Std. err. p− value 95% conf. int.
g1 .1889 .0215 0.000 .14675 .231
g2 .1744 .0747 0.020 .02797 .3208
g3 .2451 .0093 0.000 .22683 .26333
g4 .1712 .0279 0.000 .11645 .22586
Table 1: Pool estimates of γi
As Table 1 shows, all estimated parameters are significantly greater than
zero, indicating aggregate inequality/risk aversion. As for the comparison
across treatments, we notice that T3 is characterized by the highest value
for γ, and T2 by the highest dispersion. The only significant diﬀerences
between parameters are those between T3 and T1 (T4), which are significant
at the 1.6% (1.2%) confidence level, respectively. In other words, this seems
to suggest that, in T3, subjects’ actions seem to be guided by motives that
cannot be explained by inequality aversion (as in T1) or risk aversion (as in
T4) alone.8
3.2 T1 vs. T2: conditioning for player position
In this Section, we shall condition (wherever possible, that is, in T1 and
T2) the estimate of γ1 upon player position, getting separate estimates (and
independent, in case of T2, where subjects hold the same position throughout
the experiment). In other words, consistently with Fehr and Schmidt [12],
we can here identify what of “inequality aversion” is due to “guilt” (i.e.
sensitiveness to payoﬀ diﬀerence when enjoying an advantageous relative
position), and what is due to “envy” (i.e. sensitiveness to player position
when suﬀering the lower end of the stick). Let Li = (2 − i) be an index
variable which equals 1 (0) for subjects in player position 1 (2):
7We shall return to this aspect later in Section 3.2, when we report pool estimates of
γi for T1 and T2 conditioning for player position.
8By the same token, we notice that the sum of the estimated γi in T1 and T4 is
significantly higher than the paramter estimated in T3 (diﬀ. .115, z = 3.15, p = 0.002).
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γi = Lig
h
1 + (1− Li)gh2 . (3)
In Table 2 we report the estimated coeﬃcients of ghi ; i, h = 1, 2. Since,
as we already discussed in Section 2.2.2. in T2 we only keep track of the
Dictators’ choices, we drop all observations of T1 where this is not the
case.
g0 Coeff. Std. err. p− value 95% conf. int.
g11 -.4326 .0328207 0.000 -.4969 -.368
g12 .6936 .260513 0.008 .183 1.205
g21 -.7168 .426751 0.093 -1.553 .12
g22 1.565 .0329913 0.000 1.5 1.63
Table 2: Pool estimates of γi in T1 and T2 conditioning for player position
As Table 2 shows, in both treatments, the representative subject exhibits
status seeking preferences (i.e. utility is decreasing in the other player’s pay-
oﬀ, independently on player position), with higher distributional concerns
on behalf of the disadvantaged player 2 and in case of T2. In other words,
when relative positions remain constant over time, (status-seeking) aversion
to inequality is exacerbated.
3.3 Model 2: interacting with socio-demographics and Social
Capital
As we already discussed in Section 2.3, we collected information on individ-
ual socio-demographics, risk and social attitudes. In Table 3, we condition
the estimates of γi upon this personal information. To simplify the intricate
structure of interactions that would be needed by running a single regres-
sions (and taking into account the fact that no subject participated to more
than one session/treatment), we run four separate regressions, one for each
treatment.
Table 3. Estimates of γi conditioned on socio-demographics
In what follows, we shall comment on the role of each variable in the
four regressions.
1. gender is (negative and) significant in T1 only. In particular, despite
the negative correlation between gender and RL (coeﬀ. -0.2733, p =
11
0), women exhibit in T4 an attitude to risk which is comparable to
that of men, but do not show higher risk aversion in T4.
2. RL is negative and significant for all treatments, except for T3. While
the coeﬃcient for T4 is easy to rationalize (subjects with less risk averse
attitudes according to the questionnaire, also reveal lower risk aversion
thought their experimental decisions), the same result is more diﬃcult
to interpret in case of T1 and T2.
3. WLW is significant in T1 and T3 only, with opposite sign, indicating
a lower concern for inequality on behalf of subjects with higher dis-
posable income who, at the same time, are more risk/inequality averse
when choosing under the VOI.
4. RoomSizeRatio is (positive and) significant in T1 and T4 only.
5. IA. Not surprisingly, this variable is highly (positively) significant in
T1 and T3 (but not in T2, where an estimation conditional to player
position would be more appropriate for this purpose). It is more in-
triguing the fact that IA is also positively aﬀecting the estimate for
risk aversion in T4.
6. PAR. By the same token, it is not transparent the (positive and)
significant relation between PAR and the risk-aversion estimate of γi
in T4 (and T4 only).
4 Conclusion
Our study confirms that risk and inequality aversion are distinct, but related,
concepts on more than one dimension. First, as we saw in Section 3.1,
their magnitude is similar in situations in which only one of these factor
is present, but they do not perfectly substitute each other in situations
in which, such as that of the VOI, they both act on the same decision
process. Looking at socio-demographic determinants, we also see that the
same personal characteristics operate in rather diﬀerent ways, depending
on whether only risk or inequality characterizes the choice environment, or
both. In addition, typical proxies for risk attitude (such as our RL variable)
have a significant impact in subjects’ distributional choice, so as typical
Social Capital proxies have a significant impact on purely risky decisions.
Next step in the analysis would be to use such a rich database to at-
tempt the functional identification exercise carried out by the literature we
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cited in the introduction. In our setting, this exercise may be complicated
by the fact that subjects, through their decisions, directly aﬀect the level of
risk and/or inequality that characterizes the environment, so that usually
assumptions such as “constant” relative (or absolute) risk [inequality] aver-
sion are very hard to achieve (at least, with suﬃciently “portable” utility
functional specifications).
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